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Abstract 
The superstatistics approach recently introduced by Beck [C. Beck and E.G.D. Cohen, 
Physica A  322, 267 (2003)] is a formalism that aims to deal in a unifying way with a 
large variety of complex nonequilibrium systems, for which spatio-temporal 
fluctuations of one intensive variable (“the temperature” 1/) are supposed to exist. 
The intuitive explanation provided by Beck for superstatistics is based on the ansatz 
that the system under consideration, during its evolution, travels within its phase 
space which is partitioned into cells. Within each cell, the system is described by 
ordinary Maxwell-Boltzmann statistical mechanics, i.e., its statistical distribution is 
the canonical one Ee β− , but   varies from cell to cell, with its own probability density 
f(). In this work we first address that the explicit inclusion of the density of states in 
this description is essential for its correctness. The correction is not relevant for 
developments of the theory, but points to the fact that its correct starting point, as well 
its meaning, must be found at a more basic level: the pure probability product rule 
involving the intensive variable  and its conjugate extensive one. The question 
therefore arises how to assign a meaning to these probabilities for each specific 
problem. We will see that it is easily answered through Bayesian analysis. This way, 
we are able to provide an interpretation for  f(), that was not fully elucidated till now. 
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1. Introduction 
The superstatistics approach recently introduced by Beck [1] is a formalism that aims 
to deal in a unifying way with a large variety of complex nonequilibrium systems, for 
which  spatio-temporal fluctuations of one (or possibly more) intensive variables (“the 
temperature” 1/) are supposed to exist. These fluctuations reverberate on the 
conjugate extensive variable (“the energy” E): its statistical distribution departs from 
the simplest canonical distribution. This formalism can accommodate, in principle, a 
multitude of empirically found anomalous statistical distributions: power-laws 
(indeed, they were the original motivation for developing this formalism), stretched 
exponentials, etc … . The literature about superstatistics is quickly increasing: the 
formalism, so far, has been used to interpret data from fluid turbulence [2-6], random 
matrix theory [7], astrophysics [8,9], just to mention some applications. 
The intuitive explanation provided by Beck for superstatistics is based on the ansatz 
that the system under consideration, during its evolution, travels within its phase 
space which is partitioned into small cells. Within each cell, the system is described 
by ordinary Maxwell-Boltzmann statistical mechanics, i.e., its statistical distribution 
is the canonical one Ee β− , but temperature-hence -varies from cell to cell. 
Alternatively, one can think of  as uniform throughout the whole phase space, but 
varying in time. The resulting, measurable statistics is therefore an average over the 
statistical distribution for , f(): 

−
= βββ dfeEP E )()(     (1) 
This is the interpretation of superstatistics usually provided for didactical purposes 
[2]. For the sake of accuracy, Beck pointed it out that Eq. (1) is not properly 
normalized, and that a better way of writing it should be 

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β
β
ββββ )(,)()()(  (2) 
so that e-E/Z() is a proper probability density. The expressions (1) and (2) are 
referred to as respectively type-A and type-B superstatistics. It is clear, however, that 
this is just tantamount to a redefinition of f() between (1) and (2). So, we will refer 
just to (1) in the following.  
Eq. (1) has the merit of being simple and suggestive. Unfortunately, in this form, it is 
not correct. Let us see why: In a  canonical ensemble whose phase space is (q,p), the 
probability for the system to be found within the small volume dq dp is    
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In order to compare (1) and (3) we need to convert the latter to a function of energy E: 
it is necessary a transformation of variables that introduces the density of states at 
energy E, (E): the Jacobian of the transformation ([10], ch. 7). (E) does not appear 
into (1) (nor in the partition function Z in Eq. 2, as it should be) and prevents this 
formula to be useful for dealing even with the simplest Gaussian case. Infact, the 
choice E = ½ x2, f() = C(0) ( - 0), with 0 fixed constant and  Dirac delta, does 
not lead to a Gaussian distribution because of an extra x factor coming from the 
Jacobian of the transformation E  x. 
Consistency may only reappear under the hypothesis that each element of the 
ensemble is evolving on a hypersurface of constant energy, H = E, hence  (E) is 
constant and may be safely omitted from the integral. But this is not compatible with 
the canonical ensemble picture. The presence or absence of the density of states is 
therefore trivial mathematically in such equations as (1) or (2), but has a great 
conceptual importance.  
For practical purposes, the situation is, however, not so much serious: Eq. (1) is 
actually never used when moving to actual computations, nor by Beck himself. The 
correct formulation of superstatistics is as follows: let us consider a scalar variable  
we are interested in. Superstatistics assumes there exists a conjugate variable  such 
the sampling distribution for  depends upon  as well: p()  p(, ). The joint 
probability is then factored into the conditional probability for  and the marginal 
probability for : 
 ×=→
×=
χχχ
χχχ
βββχχ
ββχβχ
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   (4) 
The second line in (4) yields the marginal probability for getting  regardless of the 
value for . The Gaussian case for p(|) leads to 
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and in this form superstatistics is ordinarily used. Beck himself introduced 
superstatistics through this form in his first work on the subject ( [11], Eq. 15). In that 
paper he derived superstatistics from a dynamical realization of the underlying 
stochastic process, through a Langevin equation. It is well known that an ordinary 
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Langevin equation for a generalized “velocity” variable u yields a stationary Gaussian 
distribution for u, which can formally be associated to an exponential for the “energy” 
W through the relation W = u2/2 [12,13]. However, the identification is only formal, 
since all formulas are still written in the “velocity” (phase) space, not in the energy 
space.  
At this stage, any connection with thermodynamics has disappeared; Eq. (4) 
quantifies simply a logical relationship between probabilities. As such, the analytical 
form of both terms appearing in (4) is no longer constrained, nor for p(|) itself: it 
not even needs to be an exponential. The relationship between  and  may be 
described by a variety of analytical expressions, of which the Gaussian case used in 
(5) is just a particular choice-although there are several reasons to endowe it with a 
special status. The precise form for p(|) is usually not known beforehand, as 
instead implied in (1), but should be worked out case-by-case on the basis of the 
information at hand. 
In studies based upon superstatistics a large interest is placed upon the functional 
form for p(), that is critical is determining the final p(): the original choice [1] was 
a chi-squared distribution, that leads to a power-law for p(). A log-normal function 
appears a plausible candidate in turbulence studies [5,14,15], and other distributions 
were also studied [2,16-18]. At this stage, it is difficult to choose p() on the basis of 
some prior theory, and one is led mainly by the sought agreement a posteriori with 
experiment. Hence, no connection is drawn between p(|) and p() distributions: 
the former is postulated or deduced in advance of the problem, the latter guessed on 
the basis of the sought agreement with the experiment. But Eq. (4) requires  and   
to be related for p(|) not to become trivial: p(|)  p(). In Eq. (5), e.g.,   is the 
variance for the distribution of . In the past years,  Lavenda and coworkers attacked 
fairly harshly Beck’s works and pointed it out that a probabilistic description of 
statistical mechanics shows that fluctuations in energy and temperature are not 
independent [19-23] thermodynamic coniugate variables cannot be measured with 
infinite precision, errors in the measurement of one variable can be made vanishingly 
small only at the expense of total ignorance about the other. But finite errors in the 
estimate of a variable translate into a statistical distribution for its guessed value. 
Hence, not only statistical distribution for both variables arise naturally, but also they 
must  be related to each other. (Incidentally, an embryonal version of this statement 
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may be found in the paper [24]- see discussion around Eq. 13-written by this author 
without any prior knowledge of Lavenda’s work). 
At this point, a coherent picture is starting to emerge, enframed by the two facts that 
we are going to summarize: I) p(|) is not an universal function as postulated into 
Eq. (1); it is a distribution that must be determined on the basis of the information that 
we have about the specific problem we are going to solve. II) p(), too, is not known 
in advance. Any prior knowledge we have about it must be modified in the light of 
experiment, that involves sampling on the coniugate variable. Notice that what we 
have just given here is nothing but a restatement of Bayes’ formula (see, e.g., ref. 
[25], Eq. 1.3; or [26], Eq. 4.3).  
From these two facts there follows a consideration: the emphasis is being naturally 
shifted from an “objective” picture (the system travels across different parts of its 
phase space) to a “subjective” one. While in (1) one has been emphasizing f() to be a 
faithful description of a background truly acting stochastically, the lines above seem 
to suggest that a more productive way of looking at Eqns. (4,5) is to consider them not 
descriptive of a microscopical stochastic dynamics. Rather, they are representative of 
our state of knowledge about the system. The spreading of the statistical distributions 
over finite supports is merely a measure of how much our ignorance about fine details 
of the system (e.g., initial conditions, or boundary conditions) precludes us to 
univocally assigning numerical values to the quantities we want to measure.  
What we have been describing in the lines above is just the Bayesian approach to 
inference as explained in his monograph by Jaynes [26], that will be our reference 
here (Bayesian method itself is, of course, much older, and is traced back essentially 
to Laplace). Bayesian probability theory is a method for drawing inferences using a 
well-defined set of logical axioms and rules (Cox’s rules). Bayesian theory does not 
assign probabilities the status of physical entities: there does not exist anything like a 
random variable in the sense of a quantity that, objectively, picks randomly its value 
from an ensemble of possible choices. Rather, a probability represents our degree of 
belief about the value of the quantity under consideration, determined by our state of 
knowledge. This apparently may lead to purely subjective inferences, but once the 
state of knowledge has been mathematically quantified, it is perfectly legitimate to 
make quantitative comparisons between different predictions. Internal rules to the 
theory assure that, when logically equivalent states of knowledge are given, they lead 
to the same final results. A different, opposite, approach is the “ortodox” one, where 
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probabilities are thought to represent true physical properties of the system studied, 
and can be quantified in the limit-of-frequency sense. Intermediate positions are also 
possible. A monograph about the foundational issues of the concept of probability in 
statistical physics is Guttmann [27]. 
In this paper we will carry on an interpretation of superstatistics using Bayesian 
theory. We will show how the probabilities entering Eq. (4) are given a precise 
formulation once the form of the information we have about the system is 
quantitatively established. We will show how, this way, one is able to recover 
explicitly Eq. (4) for p() Gamma and a lognormal distributions, i.e., the two most 
important practical cases.      
 
2. Recovering statistical distributions 
Our task is recovering a probability distribution for  on the basis of the measurable 
interaction of the system with its environment. By “measurable interaction” we mean 
that we expect the fine details of the interaction to escape or to be of no relevance to 
our measurements, and only coarse quantities may be retained, usually in the form of 
moments of the distribution function. Since in Eqns. (1,5) only quantities proportional 
to moments up to the second (, ) do appear, we will stop to this order. We label the 
second moment with 2χβ . Furthermore, through a suitable shift of the reference frame, 
e.g., suitably choosing the origin of axes, we can always make the first moment to 
vanish. We stress that, up to this stage,  is not a measured quantity. Our state of 
knowledge about the system tells us that it must be taken into account when deriving 
the probability distribution for , but its precise value is of no concern to us. It is a 
nuisance parameter that will eventually be eliminated through marginalization (Eq. 4).  
Our task is that of giving explicit expressions for the two densities appearing in (4). 
Getting an expression for p(|) is straightforward: by construction, the only 
information we have about it are its first two moments. The problem of transferring 
information uniquely into a probability is a central one in Bayesian theory, and is 
solved through a variety of approaches. Among them, one of the best known and most 
used is the Maximum Entropy Principle ([26], ch. 11): it tells us that the distribution 
to be preferred among those satisfying this constraint is given by solving the 
variational equation  
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with 1= χdp  and () is a ‘measure’ function, needed to make p/ invariant under 
a change of variables. It is easy to show that () is the prior distribution for , in the 
lack of any other information. This can be spotted by solving (6) without even the 
term proportional to 2/1 χβ : the result is p ≡ µ. But in absence of any information we 
have no reason to prefer a value of  over any other, hence µ must be a constant [the 
problem of infinite limits of integration in (6) is bypassed by noticing that no finite 
physical system may spread over infinite intervals. Hence, the integral must have 
some-possibly very large-cutoff]. The final result from (6) is 





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2
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χ
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On the basis of the Maximum Entropy Principle, Eq. (7) is the most general (i.e., less 
informative) statistical distribution compatible with the constraint over its second 
moment. Notice that the functional to be maximized subject to constraints is the 
Shannon entropy, dxpp− ln . Due to its analytical structure, any constraint that can 
be written in the form of an average over p automatically leads to a probability 
density that is in the form exp(f(x)). Hence, the leading role played by Gaussian 
distributions is easily explained.  
Let us now investigate the second term, p().  was introduced on the basis of some 
measurement done, i.e., some data collected. Hence, the Bayes formula is needed 
([25], Eq. 1.3; [26], Eq. 4.3): 
 ×
×
=
χχχ
χχ
χ βββ
βββ
dIpDp
IpDp
Dp
)()(
)()(
)(    (8) 
The meaning of (8) is: the probability for  conditional to some information D is 
given by the probability of measuring D for fixed , p(D|), multiplied by the prior 
(i.e., in absence of the information D) probability we assign to , p(|I). All must be 
suitably normalized to yield a proper probability. 
The physics enters through D. In his first paper on the subject [11], Beck makes the 
hypothesis that the “kinetic energy” ½2 may be written as the sum of three 
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independent Kolmogorov velocities: 
=
=
3
1
22 2/12/1
i
iξχ . We can generalize this 
ansatz to an arbitrary number m of components: 

=
=
m
i
i
1
22 ξχ      (9)    
In order to estimate  we need to have performed some measure of the energy of the 
system or, from (9), of the m velocity components. Hence p(D|) stands for the joint 
probability density: 
∏
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The factorization comes straightforwardly by the hypothesis of the i to be 
independent components, and the Gaussian statistics arises for the same reasons the 
led to (7). 
In (8) only probability densities do enter, but we can convert p(D|) to a true 
probability by multiplying both numerator and denominator by the volume element 
∏
i
idξ . This probability must be invariant under the change of variables: (1, 2, …) 
 (X, θ2, … ), where θI (i = 2, …, m) are angle coordinates and X
m
i
i →
=1
2ξ . We 
arrive to 

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2
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The factor Xm/2-1 comes from the jacobian of the transformation. Other constant terms 
are not relevant to our purposes, since they are cancelled between numerator and 
denominator.  
There remains, finally, the prior probability p(|I): the Jeffreys rule ([26], ch. 12.4) 
states that, in absence of whatsoever information, the prior probability for a positive 
definite quantity h must be taken as  p(h|I) 	 1/h: it is a necessary consequence of the 
invariance of our knowledge about h after transformation of the scales of the problem 
(For the unfamiliar reader, a short proof of this result is given in the Appendix) .  
Inserting everything into (8) yields 
( ) 



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
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=
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 9
The quantity X is arbitrary but, for a thermodynamical system, with overwhelming 
probability, any measure will yield approximately the same, most likely value: 
XX = ([10], par. 7.2). In order to get a closer comparison with Beck’s results, let us 
perform the change of variables: bbX →→ 20 /1,/12/ χβ . After replacing (7, 12) 
into (4) we get, finally 
 
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

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
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which is the convolution of a Gaussian with a Gamma distribution. This yields, as 
known, a power law for p() [11]. Notice that, with respect to original Beck’s guess, 
there is a supplementary “1/2” in the exponent for b: m/2 –1/2 rather than m/2 – 1. 
This comes from our choice of prior probability p(|I). Beck’s ansatz is consistent, 
instead, with p(|I) = constant. (although Beck himself, later, recovered the m/2 –1/2  
using B-superstatistics rather than A-superstatistics [2]). 
The other relevant, often used distribution for p() is the log-normal one [2]. This 
may be recovered from the ansatz that the variable 2 be written as a product of m 
independent  variables:  
∏ 


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The parameter c is chosen on the basis of the constraint that )/ln( 22 χβχ c be zero-
mean: 2/)exp( Ec γ−= , with 
E  0.577… . Hence )/ln( 2χβξ ci are zero-mean, too. 
Again, the only information we postulate to have is about their second moment, and 
this leads (again on the basis of Maximum Entropy Principle) to 
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where the average is done over the gaussian probability density for  (Eq. 7). 
On the basis of the same reasoning done before, for a thermodynamical systems, all 
the iξ are almost constant and identical: 20/ βξ ≡ci , and Eq. (8) becomes 
χ
χ ββ
β
pi
β 1ln
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Inserting this expression into (4) together with (7), and with the replacements 
0
2
0
2 /1,/1 bb →→ ββ χ , leads to 
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concluding our derivation. 
It is interesting to notice that, independently of the considerations put forth in this 
work, the Bayesian method outlined in this paragraph has already actually put into 
practice within superstatistical theory: see the derivation of  statistical distributions 
from Maximum Entropy Principle done by Reynolds [5] and by the present author 
[17].   
 
3. Concluding remarks 
Beck’s superstatistics cannot be considered completely new: the mechanism of 
superposition of probability densities to obtain “anomalous” (i.e., non-Gaussian) 
distributions is well known in statistics as well in physics (see, e.g., [28], par. 14.4): 
indeed, the first suggestion to a formula like (1) came from the paper [29]. Lavenda 
and Dunning-Davies [30] claim that even the results of this latter paper should be 
traced back to earlier work. It is possible that these results have been actually 
discovered and used several times independently by several researchers in the past 
(see, e.g., [31]). We think, instead, that Beck’s attempt of finding a common intuitive 
foundation for a large variety of apparently disconnected experimental results, is valid 
and promising, and deserves to be further developed. We hope that the work 
presented in this paper might be a contribution to superstatistics theory.  
This work has two goals: first, the original interpretation (1) is found to need 
amendements.  Therefore, it has been pointed out that the more correct starting point  
is the product rule, Eq. (4) (Notice that we are not claiming originality, here: Eq. (4) 
was already suggested by Beck). An interpretation of the probabilities there appearing 
 11
within the Bayesian picture allows us to recover almost effortless the main results of 
superstatistics theory. We consider putting the emphasis on the Bayesian approach for 
all of the probabilities appearing into Eq. (4) a distinctive feature of this work. It 
allowed to address a fundamental issue otherwise not extensively investigated till 
now, namely the mechanisms through which statistical distributions for the intensive 
variable  arise from within the systems studied. 
 
Acknowledgments 
Part of this paper was stimulated by discussions with L. Salasnich. Professors Beck 
and Lavenda made useful suggestions, although not necessarily sharing the contents 
of the paper. This work was supported by the Euratom Communities under the 
contract of Association between EURATOM/ENEA. The views and opinions 
expressed herein do not necessarily reflect those of the European Commission. 
 
Appendix: The Jeffrey’s prior 
A concise derivation of Jeffrey’s prior may be found, e.g., in Sivia ([25], p. 112). For 
the reader’s sake, we provide here essentially a copy of that result.    
We wish to assign a functional form to the PDF p(h|I), where h represents the quantity 
of interest and I stands for any other information related to the problem. We have not 
any information about h but for the fact that it must be positive: h > 0.  
Gross ignorance about h means complete lack of knowledge about scales involved in 
the problem, or, equivalently, invariance of the probability: in fact, a change of p as a 
consequence of a change of scales (which could simply be changing the units with 
which we measure h) means automatically that we have some information about it, 
explicitly denied from the outset. A change of scales corresponds to a stretching or 
shrinking of h. Hence, the probability must fulfil: 
0,)()|()|( >= ααα hdIhpdhIhp    
and this can only be satisfied if 
hIhp /1)|( ∝  
which concludes the proof. 
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